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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the relevance of Pierre Bourdieu's conceptions of the body to 
the development of disability theory. We begin by discussing the limitations of 
reductive conceptions of disability. In so doing, we consider how far Bourdieu's 
(1990) concept of habitus offers a way of bringing an analysis of the body to bear 
upon an understanding of the social inequalities which are core to the lives of 
disabled people. Through focus groups with disabled people, the paper explores 
aspects of disabled people's corporeal identities, feelings, and (embodied) 
encounters in a range of social settings. The research shows that disabled people's 
lives are connected to different 'valuations' attributed to corporeal forms, and to 
systems of signification and representation which underpin them. We conclude by 
reaffirming the need to consider Bourdieu's ideas in helping in the development of 
disability theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1). Introduction 
 
"The whims of architecture have enormous power over my experience of vision: a 
postmodern shopping mall with its cantilevered floors and mirrored walls - all lit by 
indirect lighting and high intensity bulbs - can reduce my momentum. The darkness of 
restaurants and bars tightens my chest. I edge along without poise, feeling the sudden 
reverberations of alarm that come with not seeing...How does one become inured to 
unpredictable moments of helplessness?" (Kuusisto, 1998: 11-12). 
 
Kuusisto's testimony is familiar to many people with physical and mental 
impairments whose bodily functions are influenced, and often compromised, by 
broader social and structural relations. Paterson and Hughes (1999), for instance, 
document how people with speech impediments are often ignored and made to 
feel inferior because of their inability to communicate according to societally-
defined norms of accepted speech standards and behaviour. Likewise, 
Hawkesworth (2001) refers to people with facial scarring who feel too ashamed to 
enter public places without the daily ritual of covering up the face with cosmetics. 
Others consider the stigmatising of disabled people, or the cultural encoding of 
disabled bodies as diseased, inferior, and lacking mental capacities and 
capabilities (Barnes, et al, 1999). In all these instances, individual bodies 
intermingle with broader socio-cultural relations to produce what Grosz (1994: 19) 
refers to as sites 'of contestation in a series of economic, political, sexual and 
intellectual struggles'. 
 
However, an understanding of the interrelationships between disabled people's 
bodily functions, and broader socio-cultural values and practices, is 
underdeveloped in disability studies. Whilst literature on gender has been 
engaging with post-structuralist ideas about the body and its social construction 
for some years, disability theory has tended to revolve around the dichotomy of 
the medical and social models of disability. Whereas the former relies on a 
naturalistic conception of disability, that biology is at the root of impairment 
which, in turn, causes disability, the former defines disability as a social 
construction through which society oppresses disabled people. Both conceptions, 
while capturing aspects of disabled people's lives, are problematical for failing to 
recognise that there is a dialectical relationship between the individual and 
society, or where intersubjective and subjective experiences are entwined. 
 
In moving beyond reductive conceptions of disability, Barnes, et al (1999: 210) call 
for 'the application of the sociological imagination to the field of disability' which 
'directs attention to exploring the links between structural conditions and people's 
lived experience of the process of disablement'. Others suggest that the analysis of 
the body should be the meeting place for sociological and disability theory 
(Hughes, 1999, Shilling, 1993). Such calls, for an embodied notion of disability, are 
characterised by a bewildering range of approaches, ranging from the study of the 
'body as text', to the body as the site at which power/knowledge is realised. For 
Merleau-Ponty (1962), the body is an active creator of significance and the site of 
meaningful expression or, as Marks (1999: 129) suggests, 'the body should not be 
seen as matter set apart from subjectivity and the environment, but as an entity 
inextricably bound up with creative meaning and context'.    
 
A response to such observations is to deploy Bourdieu's conception of the body as 
a bearer of value in society, or as 'a possessor of power, status and distinctive 
symbolic forms integral to the accumulation of various resources' (Shilling, 1993: 
124). For Bourdieu, the body and its social location are interrelated, while the 
management of the body is core to the acquisition of status and distinction. As 
Bourdieu (1977, 1990) comments, the body can be understood in and through the 
habitus or what Jenkins (1992: 74) refers to as 'habit or typical conditions or 
appearance, particularly of the body'. Thus, ways of talking, of moving, bodily 
deportment, and general demeanour are integral to habitus or, as Marks (1999: 
129) notes, 'the body adopts a particular habitual way of relating to the 
environment'. Habitus, then, seeks to focus on the corporeal, embodied, 
experiences of everyday life and to understand systems of interaction between 
individual social beings and broader social structures in the (re) production of 
social inequalities.  
 
In discussing the relevance of aspects of Bourdieu's ideas to the development of 
disability theory, we divide the paper into three (1). First, we discuss the 
limitations of reductive conceptions of disability, and consider how far Bourdieu's 
(1990) concept of habitus offers a way of bringing an analysis of the body to bear 
upon an understanding of the social inequalities which are core to the lives of 
disabled people. Second, through focus groups with disabled people, we explore 
aspects of disabled people's corporeal identities, feelings, and (embodied) 
encounters in a range of social settings. The illustrative material shows that 
disabled people's lives are intimately connected to different 'valuations' of 
corporeal forms, and to systems of signification and representation which 
underpin them. We conclude by reaffirming the need to consider Bourdieu's ideas 
in helping in the development of disability theory.  
 
 
(2). Corporeality and reductive conceptions of impairment and disability.  
 
A range of authors note that the development of sociological conceptions of 
disablement is not well served by either medical or social models of disability 
(Barnes, et al, 1999, Hughes, 1999). The medical model is primarily concerned with 
an analysis of the physical body, or propagating a medical orthodoxy which 
conceives of bodies as objects to be cared for through the application of medicine 
and rehabilitative techniques. Such ideas are connected to the reductive 
understanding that 'the capabilities and limitations of the body determine the state 
and development of society and social relations' (Hall, 1999: 143). Oliver (1996), 
however, has attacked the medical profession for the way it ignores the social and 
personal concerns of disabled people in favour of a 'physicalist' approach. The 
medical concept isolates the disabled person as a consequence of their impairment 
and refuses to recognise how social attitudes to disability are formative to a 
disabled person's identity.  
 
In contrast, the social model seeks to understand disability as a socially generated 
category and related series of experiences external to the body. Thus, disability is 
the body being transformed by 'living in society', or where a person with an 
impairment is disabled through the attitudes and norms by which society defines 
them. For some, such as Douglas (1966), the (disabled) body is a receptor of social 
meanings while, for others, it is but a non-biological reflection of social processes 
(Shilling, 1993). In general, however, social conceptions of disability largely 
discount the corporeal, fleshy, body or, as Morris (1991: 10) notes, there is a denial 
of 'the personal experience of physical and mental restrictions, of illness, of the 
fear of dying'. Likewise, Meekosha (1998: 175) comments on how the social model 
leaves 'the impaired body as untouched, unchallenged: a taken-for-granted fixed 
corporeality', or, as Shilling (1993: 10) suggests, social constructivist models, at 
best, conceive of the body only insofar as 'the body is named as a theoretical space, 
but often remains neglected as an actual object of analysis'.  
 
In seeking to transcend the division and differences between the medical and the 
social, or the body as nature or culture, the notion of embodiment has become 
relevant (2). For Turner (1992), embodiment is an understanding of the body as 
biological or corporeal and as, simultaneously, entwined with society. As Hall 
(1999: 144) suggests, 'the body...is neither determined by biology nor society, but 
absorbs and reacts to biological and social processes in a never-ending process'. 
Grosz (1994: 19) also comments that the body should be seen as a 'site of 
contestation' or reactive to social processes. She points the way to re-figuring the 
relationship between the biological and societal by suggesting that 'the openness 
of organic processes to cultural intervention, transformation or even production, 
must be explored' (Grosz, 1994: 23). Others concur with Elias (1991) arguing that 
our capacity for language and consciousness are contained within, and are limited 
by, our bodies. Likewise, Shilling (1993: 9) suggests that any theory of human 
agency or action requires an account of the body, that 'acting people are acting 
bodies'.  
 
Such ideas resonate with Bourdieu's (1977, 1985, 1990) theory of practice which 
denies that social practices are either to be understood in terms of objective social 
laws or the result of 'the independent subjective decision making of free human 
beings' (Painter, 2000: 242). Rather, practice revolves around the habitus or the 
ways in which the body develops habitual ways of relating to broader socio-
political environments and relations. As Painter (2000: 242) suggests, the habitus is 
'the mediating link between objective social structures and individual action and 
refers to the embodiment in individual actors of systems of social norms, 
understandings and patterns of behaviour'. In turn, the forms of embodiment are 
likely to dispose actors to behave in particular ways. In elaborating, Bourdieu 
(1990: 126) notes: 
'to speak of habitus is to assert that the individual, and even the personal, the 
subjective, is social, collective. Habitus is a socialised subjectivity...neither the 
individual...nor groups as concrete sets of individuals sharing a similar location in 
social space, but in relation between two realisations of historical action, in bodies 
and things'. 
  
For Bourdieu, there is a distinction between rules and practices. Whilst objectives 
rules and norms may be established by institutions, they do not translate directly 
into people’s actions. Rather they take on practical form in the habitus. Rejecting 
positivistic conceptions of a world ‘out there’, Bourdieu (1990: 52) suggests that 
'objects of knowledge are constructed…and...the principle of this construction is 
the system of structured, structuring practices and dispositions, the habitus'. The 
habitus is thus defined as 'systems of durable, transposable dispositions' 
(Bourdieu, 1990: 53), or 'the basic stock of knowledge that people carry around in 
their heads as a result of living in particular cultures or subcultures' (Cunningham, 
1993: 1). For Bourdieu, the habitus provides an understanding of how people 
respond appropriately, and often unconsciously, to different situations, events and 
interactions with other people.  
 
Most significantly, habitus is the embodiment of these dispositions and practices. 
It provides a means of conceptualising that 'background understanding' (Taylor, 
1999: 43) from which arise the often unthinking ways in which we react to things, 
as demonstrated in our bodily comportment - the way we stand, the way we look 
at others, the way we eat and so on. Thus, Butler (1999: 113-4) describes the 
habitus as the 'embodied rituals of everydayness', or in Bourdieu’s (1990: 68) 
terms, 'body automatisms'. As the word automatism suggests, practices and rituals 
are spontaneous, and yet systematic.  They are learnt over time, such that the 
habitus has a history. Taylor (1999: 42), for example, argues that children learn the 
meanings of culture, 'partly through inculcation of the appropriate habitus'. As he 
continues: 
 
‘We learn how to hold ourselves, how to defer to others, how to be a presence for 
others, all largely through taking on different styles of bodily comportment. 
Through these modes of deference and presentation, the subtlest nuances of social 
position, of the sources of prestige, and hence of what is valuable and good are 
encoded’. 
 
Insofar as practices may be learnt, they are difficult to change and are passed on 
through generations. However, this raises questions about the effects of 
impairment on the habitus. For someone who suddenly becomes disabled, the 
learnt dispositions of the habitus may be ruptured. Practices may have to be 
learnt, or unlearnt in a conscious, thoughtful way. For disabled people, practices 
that are usually spontaneous may not be so thoughtless. Kuusisto (1998: 170-1) for 
example, notes the hours of practice and bodily re-orientation necessary when, 
after living for years with a visual impairment, he was given a guide dog. As he 
writes of moving around: “The street is more my own….I’m walking without the 
fight-or-flee gunslinger crouch that has been the lifelong measure of blindness…at 
age thirty-nine, I learn to walk upright”.   
Bodily dispositions, which are inculcated in people, are not themselves 
determined by the habitus, but by their interrelation with social fields. For Shilling 
(1993: 138), social fields are 'dynamic organising principles…which identify and 
structure particular categories of social practices (be they concerned with art, 
economics, eating, fashion…etc.)'. These fields ascribe values to certain social 
practices and forms of embodiment, and are, in a sense, the objective structures of 
Bourdieu’s world. Thus, for disabled people, a dominant social field is medicine 
and the propagation of biomedical discourses which serve, as Foucault (1980: 54) 
notes, 'to ensure the physical vigour and moral cleanliness of the social body; it 
promised to eliminate defective individuals...it justified the racisms of the state...it 
grounded them in "truth"'. However, the relationship between the habitus and 
social fields is a mutually constitutive one. Fowler (1997: 23) notes the Giddensian 
(1991) parallels in Bourdieu’s work: “people (agents), collectively or individually, 
transform or reproduce their social structures, but they do so within specific 
conditions, including those which are internalised as part of their habitus”.  
 
Thus, the bodily practices of the habitus, are produced by, but also produce and 
sustain, the social field. How then does a disabled person’s habitus relate to 
different social fields, and how do these fields shape that “background 
understanding” which gives rise to embodied practices? As the bearer of 
dispositions, the body becomes inscribed with particular values related to the 
social field, inscriptions which, for Bourdieu (1990), may be defined by, and 
define, different social groupings, primarily, in his context, classes. As Bourdieu 
(1990: 172) suggests: 
 
“inscribed within the dispositions of the habitus is the whole structure of the 
system of conditions, as it presents itself in the experience of a life-condition 
occupying a particular position within that structure. The most fundamental 
oppositions in the structure (high/low, rich/poor etc.) tend to establish 
themselves as the fundamental structuring principles of practices” 
 
In this sense, the habitus, and its embodied practices, are implicated in social 
location and inequalities. Bourdieu (1990) notes how different values of practices 
become attached to the bodily comportment of men and women, and stresses how 
bodies become the site of physical capital, or bodies which are 'recognised as 
possessing value in social fields' (Shilling, 1993: 127). The acquisition of physical 
capital is also connected, in Bourdieu's (1990) terms, to the conversion of (bodily) 
status into other forms of capital, such as economic (e.g. the acquisition of money), 
cultural (e.g. the acquisition of education) and social (e.g. the development of 
social networks or contacts). In particular, dominant classes, because of their 
greater access to, and possession of, cultural and social capital, have the ability, as 
Bourdieu (1990) argues, to define their bodies and lifestyles as superior.  
 
The habitus, then, is a source of symbolic value or the bodily and cognitive 
foundations underpinning the acquisition of prestige or status. However, the 
attainment of corporeal 'value', or bodily prestige or status, by disabled people is 
circumscribed by societal views which tend to define, and categorise, disabled 
people’s bodies as ‘abject’ and abnormal, that is, bodies without value (Grosz, 
1994, Hawkesworth, 2001). For disabled people, their bodies are usually 
understood, symbolically, only insofar as they deviate from a prescribed set of 
norms or where impairment is perceived as a threat and disabled people are 
"outsiders or symbolic 'others'." How, then, do social fields ascribe value to 
disabled people, and how do disabled people manage their bodies in seeking to 
acquire social and cultural capital? What do such processes reveal about the 
interrelationships between impairment and the social contexts underpinning the 
(re) production of disablement? These are themes to which we now turn. 
 
 
(3). Situating disability in bodies as bearers of value 
 
Bourdieu's sociology is concerned with the discovery of the socio-cultural 
processes underpinning the reproduction of structured inequalities. Likewise, as 
Shilling (1993: 127) suggests, the body, for Bourdieu, 'is an unfinished entity which 
develops in conjunction with various social forces and is integral to the 
maintenance of social inequalities'. Such inequalities are evidence of bodies as 
bearers of differential value or, as Joppke (1986: 60) notes, a 'reflection, 
acknowledgement and legitimation of a given distribution of economic, cultural, 
and social capital'. In adapting aspects of Bourdieu's ideas, we develop the 
proposition that the structured inequalities, characterising disabled people's lives, 
are related to processes in which dominant bodily forms 'monopolise not only 
physical capital but also political, symbolic and social capital, loosely 
corresponding to and operationalised on different social field' (Gottfried, 1998: 
459) (3).  
 
In developing such ideas, the rest of the paper refers to the testimonies of people 
with a range of mobility, hard-of-hearing, and vision impairments. They were 
members of focus groups set up to document disabled people feelings and 
experiences of mobility and movement in the built environment (Imrie, 1999). 
Four focus groups were set up in England, two in Weymouth and two in 
Gateshead. The locations were chosen because of the willingness of local authority 
access officers to take part in the research, acting as gate-keepers in introducing 
the researchers to disabled people in their local communities. 30 disabled people 
volunteered to take part, all of who were recruited from the local population with 
the aid of the local access officers (see table 1). The sample was partial in a number 
of ways; for example, it was unintentionally weighted towards wheelchair users 
and people that one might characterise as politicised.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Interviews also took place with property agents, such as developers and 
surveyors, and others, such as local authority officers, with an influence on the 
physical form of the built environment. The research explored a variety of themes, 
including: agents’ attitudes towards, and understanding of, disabled people’s 
access needs; disabled people’s socialisation into particular patterns of bodily 
comportment and behaviour; their feelings about society's reactions and responses 
to their bodies; a documentation of the different ways in which disabled people 
respond to such reactions, and how they seek to influence them; and, a 
consideration of how broader, social and cultural, attitudes and practices interact 
with disabled people's impairments in (re) producing a diverse range of embodied 
experiences in the built environment.  
 
Referring to the data, we discuss how interactions, between bodily impairments 
and broader socio-cultural relations, are implicated in the (re) production of 
structured inequalities based on corporeal signification and value. We develop the 
point made by Bordo (1993: 165), that the body 'is a powerful symbolic form, a 
surface on which the central rules, hierarchies, and even metaphysical 
commitments of a culture are inscribed and thus reinforced through the concrete 
language of the body’. We also discuss the contention that the systemic and 
structured inequalities of disability are (re) produced and reinforced by symbolic 
violence, or what Le Hir (2000: 135) refers to as 'a milder form of violence that 
cannot function without the complicity of the oppressed to their own oppression, 
but that remains invisible to them'.  
 
 
'Disminded bodily creatures' and the (de) valuation of disabled bodies 
 
Disadvantage and inequality of opportunity are the everyday experiences of 
disabled people (4). This is particularly apparent in relation to the labour market, 
and the physical capital vested in the disabled body. For Stone (1984: 90), 
disability originated in the eyes of the state as an 'administrative category out of a 
collection of separate conditions understood to be legitimate reasons for not 
working'. Thus, disabled people are that other which defines who, and what, a 
normal worker is. For Oliver (1990), the de-valuation of the disabled body lies in 
the changing nature of labour under capitalism, which isolated disabled people, 
and brought their corporeal differences to the fore. The transformation of work 
from a 'rural based, co-operative system where individuals contributed what they 
could to the production process to an urban, factory-based one organised round 
the individual waged labourer' (Oliver, 1990: 27-8) de-valued the disabled body, 
and reduced its 'capacity to convert physical capital into other resources' (Shilling, 
1993: 139). 
 
Oliver’s (1990) analysis points to one of the roots of the lack of symbolic power 
and status ascribed to the disabled persons body. The inability to work, and hence 
to gain value from the exchange of physical capital, is a feature of many disabled 
people’s lives, marking them out as less than equal compared to their able-bodied 
counterparts. For instance, Britain’s Disability Rights Task Force (1999: 35) notes 
that 'disabled people are only half as likely as non disabled people to be in 
employment’ and 'there is no group of disabled people with an employment rate 
as high for non disabled people'. Some authors have documented disabled 
people’s marginalisation from the labour market, and the social attitudes which 
abound about their embodied (dis) abilities (Doyle, 1995). Thus, as Hall (1999: 146) 
suggests, disabled people do not 'fit the image' sought after by employers, or that 
the presence of disabled people disrupts 'accepted notions of embodied 
employment'. Likewise, for Doyle (1995: 2) such situations 'are likely to be caused 
by employers stereotyping disabled persons and applying pre-conceptions about 
their abilities and employability'. 
 
These attitudes reinforce biomedical conceptions of disability as reducible to 
(bodily) impairment, or as an interviewee, a manger of a property firm, 
commented: "nobody wants to be prejudiced against the disabled but there are certain 
things they cannot do. They can't fly planes, they can't go hang gliding, you've got to be 
realistic". Other employers echoed such sentiments with the director of a 
construction company commenting that "they (disabled people) can't do as much, we 
have to accept that". These statements de-value disabled people, and their bodily 
capabilities, as 'less than able', and reflect Bourdieu’s (1990: 71) comment that ‘the 
elementary acts of bodily gymnastics…are highly charged with social meaning 
and values’. However, as one respondent, a mobility impaired person, argued: "we 
are not invalid, invisible and certainly we are not stupid. It is the attitudes of managers of 
companies who do not want disabled people to work for them". Likewise, another 
disabled person noted that, ''they (society) think they're looking after us but we want 
jobs and there's no reason that if we're given one we can't do it". The affirmation of a 
'less than valuable' status is part of the daily routine of job applications and 
rejections for many disabled people. As one mobility impaired respondent stated:  
 
“I’ve tried consistently since I broke my back to get work. Prior to breaking my back, I’ve 
never applied for a job without getting an interview…Since I broke my back I have never 
been asked for an interview, not once. My CV is impressive, and they take just one look at 
the fact that I broke my back and its finished” 
 
The acquisition of a bodily impairment brought the sudden attribution of a body 
without value, and provides a stark illustration of how the body itself is 
implicated in reproducing inequalities (Shilling, 1993). This is particularly the case 
in a society where paid work is key to the acquisition of social status and 
citizenship rights. For some, however, rejection was more to do with the way in 
which social fields (re) produce social and environmental structures which de-
value disabled bodies, or draw attention to the (functional) limitations of 
impairment. This is evident in relation to disabled people's mobility and 
movement in the built environment, or where inattentive design restricts disabled 
people's capacity to move from one place to another. As a respondent commented, 
"I've had lots of interviews for jobs but can't get one and I've given up...been going for 
telephonist and receptionist jobs but I've never been offered one because most of the 
businesses don't have accessible premises". Likewise, another wheelchair user stated: 
 
"I can't work for solicitors in old office blocks, just can't get in. I've applied to schools and 
again they're problems with access. One school I applied to was for a temporary post and 
the reception window was too high so I couldn't see over it". 
 
Disabled people's (lack of) acquisition of physical capital is, in part, related to bio-
medical discourses and the (social) field of medical, and related, practitioners. The 
medical profession has a powerful hold over what society deems to be the 
“legitimate body”, and in Shilling’s (1993: 145) terms, are one of a range of ‘body 
experts’ who define what constitutes an appropriate body in different social fields. 
As Bourdieu (1990: 69) notes, ‘symbolic power works partly through the control of 
other people’s bodies’ and the medical professions’ judgements affect “the 
recognition we have of our own body practices, and the body practices of others as 
‘right’ and proper, or in need of control and correction” (Shilling, 1993: 145). 
Indeed, the respondent who broke her back noted how medical assessment had 
become a major part of applying for jobs since she acquired her impairment: “I’ve 
had 5 page documents to fill out asking me to list all the doctors appointments I’ve had in 
the last 5 years. What medication I’ve had, what the prognosis for the future is. Then you 
never hear back".  
 
Such experiences bear witness to the role of medical models in influencing 
disabled people’s struggles over corporeal identity, and ‘what counts as a 
legitimate body’ (Shilling, 1993: 145). Medical discourses are core to the definition 
of disabled people and incorporate values that stress the need to ‘correct’ or 
normalise the disabled body. Their dominance is such that most aspects of society 
are not generally structured in ways that provide frequent opportunities for value 
to be bestowed on disabled bodies. The body is constituted as an object to be 
tested for eligibility for state assistance and welfare support or, as a respondent 
said, 'what I get in benefits depends on what they (the medical assessors) think is wrong 
with me'. Such values seek to construct the body through an understanding of 
(bodily) function and appearance. At an extreme, 'welfare discourse reconstitutes 
impairment, poor health and age as self-inflicted dependencies' (Ellis, 1999: 43). 
Thus, as a mobility-impaired person commented about occupational therapists: 
"professionals don't know anything about us and I feel very angry...their criteria are a 
stupid joke. The way they treat us I feel like a poor crip after a while and I feel bad about 
myself". 
 
The prominence of bio-medical ideas affects not only the potential physical capital 
vested in the disabled body, but also its cultural and symbolic value. As Branson 
and Miller (1991: 41) note, 'the contours of social inequality are structured through 
patterns of unequal access to symbolic capital, through unequal cultural 
competence...'. In this sense, disabled people are confined in their habitus through 
cultural impoverishment and cultural difference. In relation to cultural capital, for 
some disabled people their bodily demeanour is often interpreted negatively by 
others. Experiences of people avoiding or ignoring them is commonplace or, as a 
mobility impaired person recounted: "if you go to the supermarkets the older assistants 
just talk to the person beside you and often to my husband and not me". Similarly, 
another person noted: "people still walk at me, people don't see you as you don't get eye 
contact...I went to the TV shop with my father and the shop keeper spoke to my dad while I 
was the customer". In one sense, their responses reflect society’s values – embodied 
in the habitus - about the way to respond to disabled people. Their embodied 
rituals reflect the demeaning valuations of disability (as impairment). As one 
respondent recounted: "try and get on a bus in with a walking stick. I was first in the 
queue and I just got pushed out of the way". 
 
Such bodily reactions to disabled people may often be unthinking, spontaneous, 
but at the same time, unconsciously learnt. An important part of the habitus is 
related to what Bourdieu (1977: 79) conceives of as behaviour related to the 
thoughtlessness of habit and habituation. In the context of disability, Hughes 
(1999: 165) refers to such behaviour as the 'perceptual pathology of non-
disablement' or a condition which 'fails to recognise its own partiality’. Likewise, 
Paterson and Hughes (1999: 604) note that 'the information that animates the 
world is dominated by non disabled bodies, by a specific hegemonic form of 
carnality which excludes as it constructs'. These send out specific signals which 
favour the corporeal status of non-impaired people. As one respondent stated of a 
Shopmobility scheme, "initially, shopkeepers said we don't want the disabled to come in, 
there is still a perception that they get in the way, are poor and keep out the real 
customers". Similarly, another person noted that "the shops are all cluttered here...I've 
moved shoe boxes out of the way in at One Better in Boundary Street and received dirty 
looks, they just assume that their shop isn't for the disabled as they think we haven't got 
any money".  
 
Such reactions also have implications for disabled people in the context of speech. 
As a respondent suggested "people don't know how to speak to disabled people...but 
people are more accepting of us now". Given the de-valuation of the disabled body, 
how are disabled people to speak with authority, or assert their views? Bourdieu 
refers to symbolic power to analyse the language use of dominated speakers or, as 
Bohman (1999: 137) notes, 'those whose speech lacks the legitimacy and authority 
to accomplish their goals and to acquire cultural advantage and wealth'. For 
instance, in meetings and forums that shape service-providing agencies, the ability 
to understand information and construct a coherent argument is seen as a 
necessity. However, for Flyvbjerg (1998: 228), such seemingly rational argument is 
often underpinned by modes of communication which serve to add validity, 
including 'eloquence' and 'charisma'. Disabled people unable to communicate in 
such a way, or draw on these rationalising modes, may find themselves 
disadvantaged in their ability to contribute to decision-making processes.  
 
In developing such ideas, Paterson and Hughes (1999) refer to, after Leder (1990), 
‘dys-appearing bodies’ or bodies, which because of their absence of ‘normal’ 
modes of movement, speech or verbal communication, are often mis-understood 
and ignored. Such bodies literally dys-appear and, as Paterson and Hughes (1999: 
606) suggest, are ‘annihilated as subject’. Thus, in seeking to communicate in a 
‘non-normal’ form of speech, Paterson (in Paterson and Hughes, 1999: 606) 
describes the dys-appearance of his body, both functionally and aesthetically, 
when confronted with ‘embodied norms of communication’. He recounts an 
experience of getting into a lift: 
 
I was in a lift with a stranger when she began asking questions about university. It was an 
impossible situation because I realised that I would have no time no time to speak before 
one of us would reach our destination and have to exit the lift. The opportunity to 
communicate was constrained not only by the traveling time of the lift, but because the 
duration norm of this particular communication was not commensurate with my carnal 
needs…my options were reduced to a smile or a nod of the head, and I am reminded of my 
body. These every day codes of conduct (which favour the corporeal status of non-disabled 
people over my own) are in complicity with the oppression of disabled people’. 
 
One of our respondents recalled similar events or, as she said: ‘people look at me and 
treat me like a child and because I’m slow to talk no one ever has the patience to wait and 
listen…it’s like I’m not there’. Such reactions reflect relations of domination which, 
in Bourdieu (1998: 29) terms, are most powerful when they are ‘somatised, that is 
inscribed as active ingredient in the bodies – in the way people stand, walk, move, 
gesture – as well as in the minds that perceive them’.  
 
For disabled people, the denial of ascribed, and embodied, identity is common 
place, if only to deflect attention from the application of social stereotypes and 
preconceptions about their abilities. Thus, for one person, "everytime I go out I'm 
reminded of what I can't do and about what I'd like to do...and I just end up feeling bad 
(about myself)". For others, forms of bodily self censure, based upon 
embarrassment, awkwardness, or feelings of discomfort of perceived corporeal 
status, were evident. As a respondent noted, "normally when people ask I say 'no, I'm 
not disabled'. But I'm treated like a cripple. And always the inference is that if you've got 
a physical problem then obviously it means you have a mental one as well". For this 
person, their corporeality is akin to what Assister (1999: 82) characterises as 
'disminded bodily creatures' or bodies without minds or mental capacities. Others 
felt likewise in conceiving of their bodies as inferior to their able-bodied 
counterparts, because of the ways in which social encounters reaffirmed their 'de-
valued selves'. For instance, in commenting on their body image, one respondent 
noted that "there are disabled people scared of going to able bodied places as they feel they 
can't compete". 
 
However, for some disabled people, their way of life, and their bodily identity, 
becomes something that appears to be natural to them, or where the oppressive 
nature of the social world is hidden or not necessarily understood as influencing 
their bodily (de) valuations. This, then, is symbolic violence, or, as Bourdieu (1998: 
12) suggests, ‘a body knowledge that entices the dominated to contribute to their 
own domination by tacitly accepting, outside of any rational decision or decree of 
the will, the limits assigned to them’. For Bourdieu (1990: 128), ‘symbolic violence 
is found…at the heart of each social relation’ and in all institutions, and is 
reinforced by a process of mis-recognition. As Bourdieu (1977: 192) notes, 
"symbolic violence, the gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never 
recognised as such, and is not so much undergone as chosen". This, for Jenkins 
(1992: 104), is nothing less than ‘the imposition of systems of symbolism and 
meaning upon groups or classes in such a way as they are experienced as 
legitimate’.  
 
Symbolic violence tends to reproduce a medical understanding of disabled people, 
or where disabled people’s bodies are labeled as deviant and disordered, requiring 
medical and charitable interventions. Thus, for one disabled person, their whole 
life had been a constant round of being cared for by organisations, or where their 
quality of life is subject to classifications used by occupational therapists. As she 
said: ‘they lay down the criteria and assess my needs, but it’s my body and I know what I 
need but you can’t do much to challenge their decisions…you take what you’re given’. 
Others concurred, with another person noting that their mobility was dependent 
on the local dial-a-ride bus service. However, as she suggested, ‘it’s nice to have it, 
but I can only go out when they’re available and I have to fit in with them. There’s no 
independence’. In both instances, disabled people were obligated to service 
providers and dependent on their rules and modes of domination which as 
Bourdieu says, is akin to a man who ‘possesses in order to give. But he also 
possesses by giving’. 
 
Likewise, for many disabled people, their dependence on going outside with a 
carer, or only being able to gain access to a building through a rear entrance, 
becomes a naturalised way of life, to which it is difficult to see alternatives, or 
openings for independence. For one person, "whenever I go out I just accept it as 
normal that I have to…use separate facilities...you do stand out though". Similarly, 
Kitchen and Law (2001: 296), in referring to the absence of wheelchair accessible 
toilets in Ireland, note that disabled people are often accepting of the situation in 
which the lack of toilets is ‘naturalised and invisible to others'. The attitudes and 
responses of institutions and other people in society only reinforce the 
‘naturalness’ and ordinariness of such situations (5). As one respondent noted of 
the local council's attitude to providing for wheelchair users, "it is taken for granted 
that a person in a wheelchair won't come out on their own, they're always seen as a person 
who will be pushed".  
 
For Bourdieu (2000: 169), such experiences are ‘exercised invisibly and insidiously 
through familiarisation with a symbolically structured physical world…informed 
by the structures of domination’. Thus, as a wheelchair user noted, ‘wherever I go 
there are obstructions, barriers, things that get in the way; it makes it difficult to move 
about. People with legs are OK and so nothing will ever change’. For others, it was 
normal to be given the ‘back-door’ treatment when seeking to enter a building. 
Thus, for another wheelchair user, ‘back door quality all the time! We go through side 
doors, back doors, back alleys, everywhere but the front; it's degrading but we all accept it'. 
The impaired carnality of disabled people was highlighted as requiring different, 
yet unequal, treatment to the 'normal' body. As one respondent commented: 
 
"I think even though we've got more choices, there's still limits. If you want to go to a 
venue with more than one wheelchair user, you've got limits. If you want to go to the 
pictures and you want to go with a group, two will have to sit over there, another two over 
there. You don't have to do that if you're non-disabled. Disabled people are always 
expected to be separated'. 
 
Likewise, a mobility-impaired person commented that: "you can guarantee that if 
you go somewhere with friends, it's not accessible for you. You actually rely on your 
friends to get you around, even though I am independent. In this environment, I'm 
independent, if you put me in another environment, I'm not". Others conveyed feelings 
of 'not being wanted' or being made to feel unwelcome by the spatial or physical 
arrangements of particular places. As a hearing-impaired person said, about her 
deaf association attending a meeting: "The first thing that hit us was that one of the 
attendees was hearing impaired and to get into the building you had to press a button and 
then somebody says 'who are you?' and if you can't hear how can you respond?" Others 
recounted similar experiences, or where their (bodily) subjectivities were a target 
for what respondents perceived to be unfair and discriminatory treatment. Thus, 
for a wheelchair user. the "last time I travelled on the train I had to travel in the parcel 
van, but I still had to pay the full fare. Do I look like a parcel". 
 
This person's objectified identity is illustrative of how culture is encoded in or on 
the body or, as Jenkins (1992: 179) suggests 'the power of habituation derives from 
the role of the body both as a mnemonic device in cultural coding and as an 
effective vehicle for the less-than-conscious communication or expression of those 
codes'. Thus, from the aesthetic expressions of disabled people without muscular 
control, to the powerful signification of the wheelchair (e.g. 'the parcel'), the 
cultural encoding of disability is one which often renders the disabled body as 
broken, incompetent, powerless, and dependent (or a body without a subjectivity). 
However, such descriptions, as Bourdieu (1990) notes, are neither fixed nor 
unchanging, but reflect the context-specific interrelationships between bodily 
expression and social structure and agency. 
 
 
 (4). Conclusions 
 
Disabled people's bodies are subjected to the values of a society that renders them 
‘less than valuable’ and inferior to those considered to be the embodiment of 
'normality'. From genetic testing to identify those to be aborted before birth, to the 
social and cultural signification of the habitus, disabled people's experiences 
reinforce their marginality and inferior status in society. An understanding of such 
marginality is, however, hindered by disability theory which is riven by divisions 
and differences. In particular, dominant discourses of disability reproduce 
dualistic conceptions of disability. Thus, disability is characterised either as a 
product of a biological deficiency or as the result of socially constructed forms of 
disadvantage. Bourdieu’s sociology is important because it seeks to circumvent 
such dualistic conceptions of theory and practice or, as he suggests, ‘to act is to act 
with a structured body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a 
world or of a particular sector of that world – a field – and which structures the 
perceptions of that world as well as action in that world’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 81).  
 
The importance of Bourdieu’s sociology, for the development of disability theory, 
is more than just the transcendence of mind/body or society/nature dualisms. 
Thus, for Bourdieu, social location and inequalities are understood, in part, in 
relation to bodily dispositions (i.e. to comportment, ways of talking, eating, sitting, 
touching, etc) and to bodies as bearers of value. This focus is important because it 
highlights the embodied nature of disability as an analytical category of inquiry, 
while serving to redress, potentially, discourses of disability which remain 
disembodied. As Bourdieu says (1990: 23), ‘the habitus, as society written into the 
body, into the biological individual’. Such insights contribute to the calls by 
scholars, such as Zola (1991: 1), to bring ‘bodies back in’, or to recognise how 
corporeal practices ‘produce and give a body its place in everyday life’ (Turner, 
2001: 259). Bourdieu’s sociology, we would suggest, is one small contribution to 
this broader endeavour.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Our thanks to the referees whose perceptive comments permitted us to improve 
the paper, and also to the Economic and Social Research Council (grants 
R000235833 and R00429734443) who funded the research.  
 
 
Footnotes 
 
(1). It is our belief that issues about social justice are core to the lives of disabled 
people, and that academic research ought to be clearly connected to overturning 
the inequities of disablism. Such inequities consign disabled people to low levels 
of educational attainment and to unemployment or, at best, the lower rungs of the 
labour market. As a consequence, material deprivation and poverty are features of 
disabled people’s lives. Our paper seeks to highlight how bodily (de) valuations 
are, in part, linked to social inequalities. It does so in order to contribute to the 
work of disabled people’s groups who call for policy committed research or 
research that promotes citizenship rights, equal opportunities and inclusion. 
 
(2) The dominant strands of disability theory are infused with sociological and 
philosophical dualisms. Thus, the social model conforms with what Bouverserse 
(1999: 47) refers to as 'a system of objective relations that transcend individual 
agents', whereas the medical model adopts a subjectivist position or one which 
elevates individual pathologies and actions to a determinate level (of 
understanding).  
 
(3). There are, however, limitations to Bourdieu in developing an understanding of 
how people’s corporeality shapes their lives. Whilst seeking to overcome the 
dualisms of biological or societal explanation of social life, Bourdieu has, as 
Shilling (1993: 148) notes, an 'underdeveloped view of the biological dimensions of 
human embodiment'. Disabled people’s impairments may prevent them from 
adopting spontaneous and unconscious dispositions usually associated with the 
habitus. They may not move, speak, or react in the same way that others do. 
   
(4). However, this is not to suggest that disabled people constitute a 
homogeneous, coherent, and stable group; far from it, or, as Barnes, et al (1999: 14) 
note, ‘disability does not have a universal character’ and disabled people do not 
easily fit into any coherent category (of explanation or experience).  
 
(5). This ‘naturalness’ is, however, a product of the social world. To think 
otherwise might well lead to a problematical analysis of disabled people which 
‘blames them’ for their social status and position.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the focus groups 
 
 
Group 1 
Weymouth 
 
 
Group 2 
Weymouth 
 
Group 3 
Gateshead 
 
Group 4 
Gateshead 
 
9 participants; 
4 male  
and 5 female 
 
2 in 
wheelchairs 
 
3 visually 
impaired 
 
2 hearing 
impaired 
 
2 with walking  
difficulties 
 
 
 
5 respondents: 
4 male 
and 1 female 
 
3 in 
wheelchairs 
 
1 with speech  
impairment 
 
1 with walking 
difficulties 
 
8 respondents: 
4 male  
and 4 female 
 
4 in 
wheelchairs 
 
1 visually 
impaired 
 
1 hearing 
impaired 
 
2 with 
difficulty in 
walking 
 
8 respondents: 
4 male  
and 4 female 
 
3 in 
wheelchairs 
 
3 visually 
impaired 
 
3 hearing 
impaired 
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